Rory J. Atcitty, by and through his parent Roger Atcitty, Sr. v. Board of Education of the San Juan County School District, Lyman Grover : Reply Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1998
Rory J. Atcitty, by and through his parent Roger
Atcitty, Sr. v. Board of Education of the San Juan
County School District, Lyman Grover : Reply
Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Eric P. Swenson; Rosalie Reilly; Attorneys for Appellant.
L. Robert Anderson ; Daniel G. Anderson; Anderson & Anderson; Attorney for Appellees.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Atcitty v. Board of Education of the San Juan County School District, No. 980096 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1399
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 






OOCKET NO. Itimfy - r j 
RORY J. ATCITTY, by and 
through his parent Roger 
Atcitty, Sr., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE 
SAN JUAN COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, LYMAN GROVER, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 980096-CA 
Priority No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal From The Seventh Judicial District Court In And For San 
Juan County, Utah, The Honorable Bryce K. Bryner, Presiding. 
L. Robert Anderson, # 0101 
Daniel G. Anderson, # 6166 
Anderson & Anderson, P.C. 
P.O. Box 275 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Telephone: (435) 587-2222 
Attorneys for Appellees 
Eric P. Swenson, # 3171 
P.O. Box 940 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Telephone: (435) 587-2843 
Rosalie Reilly, # 6637 
P.O. Box 404 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Telephone: (435) 587-3266 
Attorneys For Appellant 
Utah Court of ADoeals 
MAY 1 \ 1998 
Julia D'Alesendro 
Ill Till! UTAH iJVllJKT OF APPEALS 
RORY J. ATCITTY, by and 
through his parent Roger 
Atcitty, Sr., 
Plaintiff and Appellantf 
v. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE 
SAN JUAN COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, LYMAN GROVER, 
Defendants Appellees, 
Priority No, 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal * 
Juan County, The Honorable Bryce 3ryner, Presiding, 
ii. Robert Anderson, # 0101 
Daniel G. Anderson, # 6166 
Anderson & Anderson, P.C 
P.O. Box 275 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Telephone: (4 35) 587-2222 
Attorneys for Appellees 
Eric P. Swens« 
P.O. Box 940 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Telephone: (435) 587-2843 
Rosalie Reilly , # 6637 
P.O. Box 404 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Telephone: (435) 587-3266 
Attorneys For Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
ARGUMENT 1 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS A SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
a. Notice And The Opportunity To Be Heard 1 
b. Mitigation Of Punishment And Due Process 14 
1 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Cafeteria Workers v. McElrov. 367 U.S. 886f 895 (1961) 8 
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 
(1985 ) 9 
Goss v. Lopez. 419 U.S. 565 (1975) 6, 8, 9, 10 
Hiqqjns v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993)... 2 
Interlake Distributors. Inc. v. Old Mill Towne. 
339 Utah. Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah App. 1998) 2 
Kitchen v. California Gas Co.. 821 P.2d 458, 460 
(Utah App. 1991) 2 
Lamb v. Panhandle Community Unit School Dist. No. 2. 
826 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1987) 15 
Matthews v. Eldridqe. 424 U.S. 319 (1976) 8 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co.. 339 U.S. 306 
(1950) 10 
Roach v. University of Utah. 968 F.Supp. 1446, 1451 
(D.Utah 1997) 8 
Strickland v. Inlow. 519 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1975) 15 
U.S. v. Hougham. 364 U.S. 310 (1960) 14 
Worrall v. Qqden City Fire Dept.. 616 P.2d 598 
(Utah 1980) 9 
Young v. Seabord Corp.. 360 F.Supp. 490 (D. Utah 1973) 14 
• • 
11 
STATUTES AND COURT RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 53A-11-906-907 15 
U.S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process 
Clause 10 
iii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RORY J. ATCITTY, by and 
through his parent Roger 
Atcitty, Sr., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE 
SAN JUAN COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, LYMAN GROVER, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 980096-CA 
Priority No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS A SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
a. Notice And The Opportunity To Be Heard. 
Rory Atcittyxs ("Rory") suspension from school required 
enhanced due process protection under the unusual circumstances of 
this case. Appellants Brief, Page 31-37. Yet he was not afforded 
the most basic requirements: adequate notice and a proper and 
timely opportunity to be heard. The District's myopic and fact-
selective position is contrary to the standards of appellate 
review. On appeal, Rory is entitled to a much broader view of what 
transpired when he was suspended from school. He is entitled to do 
so because this Court views the facts and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing 
1 
the motion. E.g., Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 233 
(Utah 1993); see also Interlake Distributors, Inc. v. Old Mill 
Towne, 339 Utah. Adv. Rep. 7, 8 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting Kitchen 
v. California Gas Co.. 821 P.2d 458, 460 (Utah App. 1991)). 
Here, the principal of Whitehorse High School ("Mr. Grover") 
received information that students had used marijuana during a band 
trip to Colorado. Lyman Grover Deposition. R. 940, at Pages 10, 12. 
Mr. Grover began an investigation which spanned the week of May 13-
16, 1996 and resulting in Rory's suspension. Jd. at Pages 36-37. 
On May 13, 1996, Mr. Grover called Rory's father and invited 
him to the school rather than talking with Rory. Lyman Grover 
Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 12-13. Mr. Grover spoke with Rory's 
father ("Mr. Atcitty") and provided him a cursory explanation of 
the allegations. Ld., at Pages 14-15. Mr. Atcitty attempted to 
informally resolve the matter, but was rebuffed by the principal 
who, despite not being in full possession of the facts, took a 
hard-line attitude that there would be no deals or accommodations. 
Id., at Page 17. Mr. Atcitty responded by stating that he did not 
want his son interrogated unless he was present. Id. at Pages 23-
25. Mr. Atcitty also asked for a hearing and an explanation of the 
process involved. Roger Atcitty, Sr. Deposition, R. 939, at Pages 
24, 26. Mr. Grover, however, states it was his policy to not 
explain suspension procedures until he had decided what action to 
take. Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Page 28. Thus, Mr. 
Grover failed to advise Mr. Atcitty where and when Rory would be 
given an opportunity to present his side of the story, Roger 
2 
Atcitty, Sr. Deposition. at Pages 18-19, and that he intended to 
speak with Rory without Mr. Atcitty being present.1 Lyman Grover 
Deposition. R. 940, at Pages 20, 23. Mr. Grover did tell Mr. 
Atcitty that under some circumstances Rory would have the right to 
confront his accusers. Id., at Pages 17-18. He also refused to 
provide Mr. Atcitty with the names of some of his informants. JEd. 
at Page 16. 
On May 14, Mr. Grover approached Rory when Mr. Atcitty was not 
present2 with the purpose of interrogating him about the alleged 
incident. Lyman Grover Deposition. R. 940, at Pages 23-27; Rory 
Atcitty Deposition. R. 941, at Pages 29-34. In response to the 
Principal's request that Rory write out a statement as to what 
happened, Rory refused. Lyman Grover Deposition. R. 940, at Pages 
24-25. During this encounter Mr. Grover did not tell Rory he was 
suspended, nor was he informed about suspension procedures. Rory 
Atcitty Deposition, R. 941, at Page 28. Rory was not warned by the 
principal of the consequences of not discussing the matter or that 
this was his only chance to tell his side of the story. Id. Rory 
1
 Appellees misstate the facts by stating Rory had an 
opportunity to be heard on May 13. Appellees' Brief. Pages 20-21. 
In fact, Mr. Grover had not finished his investigation and was not 
in full possession of the facts. At that point, he elected only to 
talk to Rory's father. Lyman Grover Deposition. R. 940, Pages 14-
15. Rory was not present when Mr. Grover and Mr. Atcitty talked. 
Id. Furthermore, no arrangements were made (on May 13) to speak to 
Rory when his father was at the school. Jd. at 14-22. 
2
 Again, defendants misstate the facts by saying, Appellees' 
Brief. Pages 11-13, that both Rory and his father were present. In 
fact, Rory was alone with Mr. Grover and an assistant principal. 
Lvman Grover Deposition. Page 24. Mr. Grover later equivocated, 
saying that he does not remember whether he talked with Mr. Atcitty 
at any time that day. Jd. at Pages 26-27. 
3 
was never provided with the facts which formed the basis for the 
allegations. Id. at 24-37. 
Later that same day (May 14)f Mr. Atcitty went to the school 
in response to a call from Rory. Mr. Atcitty talked with the 
principal, and again told Mr. Grover that his son was not to be 
interrogated unless he was present. Roger Atcitty. Sr. Deposition, 
R. 939, Pages 9, 7-8. Again, Mr. Grover failed to explain the 
disciplinary process to Mr. Atcitty, Lyman Grover Deposition!, R. 
940, at Page 28, despite Mr. Atcitty's having again asked for this 
information. Roger Atcitty, Sr. Deposition, R. 939, at page 24. 
Mr. Grover testified that at that point he had not decided what 
action to take other than to continue his investigation. Lyman 
Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 9-10, 28. Mr. Atcitty left 
this encounter with the principal at "a total loss" as to what was 
going to happen next. Roger Atcitty Deposition, R. 939, at Page 8. 
Although Mr. Grover was aware that Rory would not speak without his 
father being present, the principal did not warn Mr. Atcitty that 
Rory had missed his only opportunity to be heard, or enlist his 
support in getting Rory to provide a written statement. Lyman 
Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 22-28. 
A reasonable inference can be made from the circumstances of 
the encounters of May 13 and 14, that both Rory and his father had 
a reasonable expectation that Rory would be given a meaningful 
opportunity at a later time to tell his side of the story. This 
inference is reasonable because Mr. Grover had not made a decision. 
Moreover, any ambiguity with respect to the process was a 
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deliberate action by Mr. Grover. Although Mr. Grover professed 
that his policy was to explain suspension procedures only at the 
time a decision was made, he did not explain due process procedures 
at the time he suspended Rory. Mr. Grover had told Rory and his 
father that under some circumstances Rory would be entitled to 
confront his accusers. At the same time, he did not explain the 
circumstances and he withheld the names of some of his informants. 
Rory and his father were entitled to conclude that they would be 
given this and other critical information when a decision was made 
and when Rory would be heard while confronting his accusers. 
A reasonable inference can be made based on the May 13 and 14 
encounters that Rory understood this stage of the process to be 
fact-finding because the principal only wanted Rory (as well as the 
other students) to write a statement. 
A reasonable inference can be made based on the May 13 and 14 
encounters that Rory understood that the principal was not holding 
a hearing because Rory was not told it was an adjudicatory meeting, 
given the fact that no decision had been made and no punishment had 
been imposed. 
It was reasonable that Rory would not speak to the principal 
alone because he knew that the principal had been told by his 
father, without Mr. Grover saying anything to the contrary, that 
speaking with Rory would only be done with the father present. 
It was reasonable that Rory would expect that the principal 
would fully involve Rory's father because instead of talking with 
Rory directly on May 13 Mr. Grover called Mr. Atcitty and invited 
5 
him to the school. 
It is a reasonable inference that Rory would speak when a 
decision was made on when/where a hearing would be held where he 
would be informed of the allegations and the basis of the charges. 
It is a reasonable inference that Rory would not give Mr. 
Grover a written statement because his father had told him that he 
wanted to be present since the statement was intended for police, 
not school purposes.3 
It is also reasonable to infer that Mr. Grover was aware of 
the circumstances and understood why Rory would be reluctant to 
give a written statement. 
It is reasonable that given Mr. Grover's awareness of the 
circumstances he would correct any impressions that he felt were 
mistaken on Rory's part. 
It is a reasonable inference that Rory and his father would 
have spoken out and given Rory/s side of the story if, at any time, 
the principal had warned them that failure to respond to Mr. 
Grover's questions or make a written statement would waive Rory's 
3
 The principal considered the situation a police matter from 
the outset. Lyman Grover Deposition. R. 940, at Pages 30-31. 
Although the other students had verbally acknowledged complicity in 
the incident, Mr. Grover went further and required written 
statements that he eventually gave to the police. Mr. Atcitty 
understood the implications of the situation when he met with Mr. 
Grover the day before. Roger Atcitty Deposition. R. 939, at Pages 
7-9. Mr. Grover needed Rory's written statement to add to the 
others he was planning to give to police. If he were only 
interested in getting Rory's side of the story, Mr. Grover would 
have engaged in a dialogue rather than demanding a written 
confession. Verbal statements are sufficient for school purposes, 
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581-584 (1975), but written 
statements are far more valuable to the police. 
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only opportunity to be heard. 
On May 16f 1996, Mr. Grover decided to suspend Rory and other 
students, Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Page 29, and to call 
the police. Id., at Pages 30-31, 36-39f 53-54. A police officer 
arrived at the school and was provided with students' statements 
and other reports by Mr. Grover. Id. at Pages 37, 53-54. Mr. 
Grover then summoned the students to his office and announced his 
decision to suspend them in the police officer's presence. Id. at 
Pages 36-37. Immediately following the suspension, the officer 
questioned and arrested the students. Id. at Pages 36-39. At no 
time was Rory advised that this was his chance to tell his side of 
the story, despite its apparent unfairness. Id. Nor was Rory told 
about suspension procedures. Id. Although Rory said nothing to the 
principal, he did make a denial to the police officer. Lyman Grover 
Affidavit, R. 513, 516, 1 9. 
The facts and reasonable inferences drawn from them are that 
the May 16 confrontation involving Rory and the police officer is 
that the principal's suspension announcement was nothing more than 
a fait accompli and that Mr. Grover's only motive for the meeting 
was to do nothing other than inform the students of the suspension 
before allowing the police officer to interrogate and arrest them. 
A reasonable inference can be made from the totality of the 
circumstances of the three encounters between the principal, Rory 
and Mr. Atcitty is that Rory was denied adequate notice of his 
right to be heard in a meaningful manner. 
A reasonable inference can be made from the totality of the 
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circumstances of the three encounters involving the principal, Rory 
and Mr, Atcitty that Rory was denied an opportunity to be heard at 
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. 
The reasonable inferences arising from the facts were not 
discussed or even acknowledged in the trial court's opinion. See 
Ruling On Plaintiff's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, R. 84-
86; Ruling On Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, R. 804-806. 
The point of such cases as Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) 
and Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) is that due process 
must be applied in a flexible manner and tailored to the 
circumstances of each particular case. Matthews uses a balancing 
test in order to apply due process to the facts of a particular 
case. Appellant's Brief, Pages 31-37. The District wants this 
Court to refuse to follow Matthews. Appellees7 Brief, Pages 34-35. 
This rigid and narrow view is contrary to due process principles. 
Indeed, courts have held that due process standards preclude "any 
concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every 
imaginable situation." Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 
895 (1961); see also Roach v. University of Utah, 968 F.Supp. 1446, 
1451 (D.Utah 1997). Yetf in cases of student discipline, the 
District would have it that due process is satisfied every time a 
student has any conceivable chance to talk no matter what the 
situation may be. This is incredulous given Mr. Grover's absolute 
failure to explain anything to Rory or his father. Under the 
District's theory, the circumstances and background of the matter 
would have little bearing or significance. 
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But the circumstances surrounding Rory's encounters with the 
principal do matter, especially since the right to notice is so 
intertwined with the right to be heard. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 
419 U.S. 565, 579. Without proper notice, the opportunity to be 
heard is meaningless. The principal never explained the suspension 
process to Rory.4 Of critical importance is Mr. Grover's failure 
to warn Rory that he was being disciplined, that encounters between 
himself and Rory were actually hearings instead of mere inquiries, 
and that these encounters would be his only opportunity to be 
heard. Rory never knew that his right to stay in school was in 
jeopardy. Providing proper information should have been done 
before action was taken. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582, 584; 
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 
(1985); see also Worrall v. Qgden City Fire Dept., 616 P.2d 598, 
601-602 (Utah 1980) (due process requires notice that a particular 
time is appropriate to be properly heard). At the least, 
information about what to do and when to do it should have been 
given at a time sufficient to enable Rory to react appropriately. 
It is one of the most disturbing anomalies of Rory/s treatment 
that Mr. Grover implicitly acknowledged his obligation to explain 
4
 The District responds to Rory's claim that the disciplinary 
policies are vague and ambiguous by saying that this is a separate 
issue. This shows no understanding of how the vague policies 
skewed the notice which was required to be given to Rory. The 
District's rules do not identify the process to be used in short-
term suspensions. A student and his or her parents are left to 
guess about when is the appropriate time for a student to be heard. 
The principal, as the only source of information and the only 
official in authority dealing with the student and parents, must 
therefore explain this procedure, something Mr. Grover did not do 
with Rory. 
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the due process procedure when he testified that his policy was to 
provide that information at the time he makes a decision, Lyman 
Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Page 28, then failed to do so at the 
time he suspended Rory and the other students, Id. at pages 36-37, 
or any other time, this despite Mr. Atcitty's having made a 
specific request for it. Roger Atcitty Deposition, R. 939, at Page 
24. Mr. Grover was cryptic at best, and deceptive at worst, in 
communicating his intentions. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co. , 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950), the Court said that for notice 
to satisfy the Due Process Clause the "means employed must be such 
as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably 
adopt..." (emphasis added). One actually desiring to provide 
information to an unsophisticated child, or a student who at times 
was absent but being represented by his parent, would, at the very 
least, speak clearly and in specific terms. Yet, Mr. Grover would 
not do this. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (required notice 
must be "effective"). It is not surprising that neither Rory nor 
his father understood what they should do or what the principal 
intended to do. 
The clear implications of Mr. Grover's misleading both Rory 
and his father and in seeking only a written statement without 
engaging in meaningful dialogue with Rory is that the principal was 
not interested in the informal give and take between student and 
disciplinarian required by Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584. 
Not only was Rory denied proper notice, he was denied the 
right to be heard in a meaningful manner. While notice is a 
10 
compelling aspect of Rory's due process claim, see Appellants' 
Brief, Pages 16-20, the District says nothing in its response about 
this critical issue other than to claim that Rory and his father 
were given general information about the allegations during the 
week's encounters and that this was all the school district had to 
do. The defendants miss the point entirely because the real 
question is whether Rory was told what was happening to him, fully 
informed about what the principal was trying to do, and advised 
about what he should do. It is this information, and only this 
information, that can guide Rory through the process and ensure 
that he or his parents take the proper measures, make the right 
decisions, and speak out at the appropriate time. Mr. Grover could 
have and should have taken the time to provide this information, 
particularly since Mr. Atcitty requested it early on while asking 
for a hearing. See Roger Atcitty, Sr. Deposition, R. 939, at Pages 
24, 26. 
The May 13 meeting between Mr. Atcitty and the principal was 
not a meaningful opportunity to be heard because Rory was not 
present, not withstanding the District's assertion to the contrary. 
See Fn. 1, supra. Mr. Grover did not have all the facts and did 
not provide Mr. Atcitty with what information he did know. Most 
importantly, the principal did not tell Mr. Atcitty what the 
disciplinary process was or warn him or Rory how to conduct 
themselves despite Mr. Atcitty's having repeatedly requested this 
information. 
The May 14 encounter between Rory and Mr. Grover cannot be 
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called a meaningful due process hearing because the principal was 
only focused on collecting written statements from students. He 
wanted a written statement from Rory to add to the statements of 
the other students that he was planning to give to the police. He 
made no accusations, did not suspend or discipline Rory, and, most 
telling, did not warn Rory that this encounter was really the 
hearing that would be his only chance to be heard. Rory's silence 
in the face of this approach is understandable because he had a 
reasonable expectation that he would be heard at a later time when 
his father would be present. It was also reasonable for him to 
assume that this conversation was only meant to elicit facts and 
was not a hearing. Mr. Grover did nothing to dispel these 
impressions either when talking with Rory or when Mr. Atcitty 
requested that he be present when the child was interrogated. It 
is reasonable to infer that Mr. Grover knew that he had created the 
wrong impressions and deliberately did nothing to correct the 
situation.5 See Appellants' Brief, Pages 20-22. 
It would have been easy and no burden imposed on either the 
principal or the school district to balance the District's right to 
effectively administer discipline in its schools with Rory's right 
to a public education and to being treated fairly by school 
5
 Rory knew that Mr. Grover had first contacted the father 
rather than going to Rory on May 13. Rory knew that Mr. Grover 
again spoke to Mr. Atcitty on May 14. Mr. Grover knew that Rory 
had a reasonable assumption (one the principal did not dispel) that 
when it came time to discuss matters with the principal that Rory's 
father would be involved. Mr. Grover also knew that Mr. Atcitty 
was laboring under the impression that an investigation was going 
on, that it was continuing in nature, and that when completed the 
principal would allow Rory to state his side of story. 
12 
officials. Mr. Grover need only have clearly stated his 
intentions, told Rory what the evidence was, described the process 
involved, told Rory that he was being disciplined, and that this 
would be the proper and only time for Rory to speak out and give 
his side of the story. Mr. Grover failed to take these basic 
steps.6 
The District does not claim that Rory incorrectly states the 
facts apparent from the record other than to say, erroneously, that 
Rory does not address what happened but rather focuses on what 
should have happened. Appellees/ Brief, at Page 9. Significantly, 
the District does not dispute the reasonable inferences that Rory 
draws from the testimony. Rather, the District simply takes the 
narrow view that Rory could have given his side of the story on 
more than one occasion but did not do so until it was too late. 
However, taking this tact ignores the factual record and distorts 
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the occasions on 
which Rory, Mr. Grover and Mr. Atcitty talked. It also clashes 
with the fundamentals of due process regarding notice and the 
opportunity to be fairly heard. The District does not provide a 
satisfactory explanation for these questions, choosing instead to 
concentrate on collateral issues such as whether enhanced due 
6
 Although Rory's due process claim can be decided on this 
basis alone, this Court may move on to consider whether a more 
enhanced due process procedure was required under the unusual 
circumstances of this case. Rory faced serious charges with the 
possible loss of honor-student status and suspension from school. 
The principal's involvement with the police in gathering evidence 
which culminated in Rory's arrest also militates in favor of 
enhanced protection. See Appellant's Brief, Pages 28-37. 
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process is due,7 or whether Rory was entitled to amend his 
complaint.8 Even if this Court rules against Rory on these claims, 
the fundamental question of notice and the right to be properly 
heard still squarely falls on Rory's side of the due process 
equation. The trial court's summary judgment was, therefore, 
clearly inappropriate.9 
b. MITIGATION OF PUNISHMENT AND DUE PROCESS. 
The trial court's reasoning that the District complied with 
due process in all respects is particularly suspect regarding the 
denial of Rory's right to be heard in mitigation of punishment. 
This basic right to ameliorate the punishment and ensure that 
discipline follows school policy is an important component of due 
process. Appellants' Brief, Pages 39-42; 25-27. The issue was 
raised in plaintiff's initial complaint. Plaintiff's Complaint, R. 
3,19. Mr. Grover should have given Rory an opportunity to decide 
what punishment to accept10 and an opportunity to require that the 
7
 Compare Appellant's Brief, Pages 31-37 with Appellees' 
Brief, Pages 22-38. 
8
 Although the District's response focuses on whether the 
amendment raises new claims, plaintiff's were entitled to amend for 
other reasons, including refining the remedies that Rory was 
entitled to receive from the trial court, see U.S. v. Hougham, 364 
U.S. 310 (1960) , and to modify previously alleged claims. Young v. 
Seabord Corp., 360 F.Supp. 490, 497 (D. Utah 1973). 
9
 Indeed, the facts and reasonable inferences from the facts 
taken in a light most favorable to Rory indicate that the trial 
court should have entered summary judgment in his favor. See Brief 
Of Appellant, Pages 13-37. 
10
 Part of the suspension-hearing process is the provision of 
home-schooling services to the student. These are required by the 
District's disciplinary procedures, e.g., School District Policy 
No. 7335(3), R. 238; School District Policy No. FF(3), R. 252; 
14 
discipline comport with district policy. 
Mr. Grover did not explain alternative punishments to Rory, 
with the result that Rory was deprived of important home-schooling 
services at the end of the school year for six of the ten days that 
he was suspended. Roger Atcitty Sr. Deposition. R. 939, at Pages 
13-18; see also Lyman Grover Deposition. R. 940, at Pages 35-37.12 
Since the trial court erred in finding that defendants complied 
with due process on this issue, a summary judgment approving, in 
all respects, the manner in which Rory's suspension from school was 
conducted is inappropriate. And finally, another matter which 
should be of concern to this Court is that the trial court's 
decision regarding mitigation of punishment clashes with the trial 
School District Policy No. FGAB(AHlHa), R. 255, and Utah state 
law, Utah Code Ann. §§ 53A-11-906-907. The student may elect to 
fulfill the ten-day suspension obligation by either entering an 
alcohol rehabilitation program or by receiving home-schooling 
services. San Juan School District Policy No. FGABfAWl)a-b, R. 
255. Rory elected to receive home-schooling. 
11
 See Appellants' Brief, Page 25. The District misconstrues 
Rory's claim, believing that Rory wanted a separate hearing on this 
question. Rather, Rory's complaint is that he was given no 
opportunity at all to mitigate punishment. See Lamb v. Panhandle 
Community Unit School Dist. No. 2, 826 F.2d 526, 528-529 (7th Cir. 
1987. The District's distinguishes Lamb by saying it was an 
expulsion, not a suspension case. But Lamb should not be so 
narrowly construed. Mitigation of punishment is part of due 
process. See Strickland v. Inlow, 519 F.2d 744, 746-747 (7th Cir. 
1975). The District also says that Rory had three opportunities to 
mitigate punishment. This contention is belied by the fact that no 
decision had been made and no punishment imposed on two of the 
occasions that Rory or his father talked to the principal and on 
the third occasion where Rory was being arrested, hardly a 
meaningful opportunity to discuss anything much less a school 
policy that had never been explained to him. 
12
 This occurred despite the District's being placed on notice 
of Rory's mitigation claim when the lawsuit and a request for a 
restraining order were filed following the suspension. 
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court's finding that there are disputed factual issues. R. 815-
816; see also R. 867-869; 880-896. If this Court finds there to be 
disputed facts, see Appellants' Brief, Pages 39-42, Rory is 
entitled to a reversal of the judgment and a trial on this 
question. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should reverse the judgment and order of the trial 
court. The Court should order the trial court to enter a partial 
judgment for Rory on his claim that he was suspended from school 
without due process, reserving the question of remedy for trial. 
In the alternative, this Court should remand the case for trial 
proceedings based on his amended complaint. 
Dated this 14th day of May, 1998. 
Eric P. Swenson 
Rosalie Reilly 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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